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Abstract—Increased power consumption and power supply 
variability require implementation of modern tools for 
intelligent management and control of grid networks. One of 
the most promising advancements in technology is the Smart 
Grid network. Unfortunately, this technology is still rapidly 
evolving and at this point contains many security issues. As 
recent attacks have shown, only some of these issues are 
known. This paper is using a systematic approach to detect 
these issues and to analyze all types of attacks on the Smart 
Grid networks. The last part of the paper proposes solution 
models for securing Smart Grid networks against found 
vulnerabilities.   
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The demand for electricity nowadays is higher than ever. In 
order to meet this demand, the current capacity of power 
plants and capacity of distribution networks are highly over 
provisioned. This precaution requires significant additional 
costs and increases the system complexity. Moreover, non-
efficient monitoring of real-time power demands of 
households and companies is causing additional problems - 
the power generation and transport of electricity cannot be 
effectively regulated. 
The Smart Grid (SG) is a concept of adding 
communication equipment into the traditional grid networks 
in order to connect consumers, distribution companies, and 
electricity generation companies [1]. Creating such a two-
way information channel allows consumers to get 
information about their current power consumption and 
therefore brings an option to reduce their costs. On the 
electricity generation side, it allows these companies to 
regulate the power generation and trade with the electricity 
in real-time. Finally, it also allows the distribution 
companies to manage and control the distribution grid 
network. 
The main benefits of the SG are more effective generation 
and distribution systems, more agile and reliable 
functionality, and effective utilization of "green devices" 
(like renewable sources and electric cars) and devices for the 
Internet of Things (IoT). 
The transformation of traditional networks into the SG 
networks is utilizing modern computing tools and principles. 
This gives the opportunity for adding interesting benefits, 
but also poses new security risks. 
One of the most publicized software attack was the 
Stuxnet worm, which caused damage to the Iran nuclear 
program in 2010 [2]. This worm aimed SCADA systems 
developed by Siemens and it was able to take control over 
programmable logic controllers (PLCs). 
Similar attacks are currently massively deployed in Israel, 
which is investing billions of dollars into the cyber security 
research [3]. 
Attacks on distribution networks were also realized during 
the Ukraine conflict, where supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) systems were attacked by the Trojan 
horse BlackEnergy. This code caused blackout to the entire 
region of Ivano-Frankivsk [3]. 
The SG networks are not vulnerable only to the hacker 
attacks, but also to other security risks. In 2008, the power 
plant in Georgia, US was shut down after a computer 
software update. An engineer tried to upgrade a system for 
the plant's business network, but the patch reset the data on 
the control system, causing automatic safety systems to 
trigger the shut down [4]. 
These vulnerabilities and resulting attacks are caused by 
the fact, that the SG networks are a modern technology, not 
exposed to vulnerabilities for decades like traditional 
networks. Moreover, the SG networks are considered to be 
critical infrastructure and represent a significant strategical 
target. Security of these networks has to be therefore 
considered not only in the design phase, but also during 
realization and network operation phases. 
 
II. THE SG NETWORKS AND THE RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
A. Components Used in the SG Networks 
Smart electricity meters are devices for measuring power 
consumption, voltage, and maximum power output. The 
device stores different events and other useful data. It can 
also perform additional actions like disconnecting a 
consumer from the distribution network, limiting the 
available power consumption (FUP), changing tariff group, 
etc. The meter contains a communication module - either a 
modem for the PLC network (transfer data to the 
concentrator), or for telecommunication networks (GPRS, 
3G, 4G). The last wireless option is to use radio 
communication. Another option is to use a wired connection 
like RS-485, M-BUS, or Ethernet. These technologies are 
typically used in company networks. 
Data concentrators act as an interface between electrical 
or radio networks and other network types - most commonly 
TCP/IP. Data concentrators are placed inside a substation 
due to the fact, that PLC traffic is not able to go through a 
transformer. A single data concentrator serves 
approximately 100 metering devices, but in some cases, can 
serve even more than 1000 of them. Communication with 
the server is primarily done over wired connection, or Wi-
Fi, and mobile networks are used only as a backup.   
Servers store and analyze data gathered from the 
measuring devices. Some of this data is available to the 
customers, while some of it is used only by energy 
distribution or generation employees. These employees can 
also change the state of the devices, and therefore prevent 
the network blackout, or set a different tariff group.    
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Information devices includes clients' PCs, smart phones, 
or information panels. All of these devices can inform 
customers about current power consumption, tariff group, 
and other values. The goal is to provide real-time feedback, 
which allows the customers to save the energy consumption 
and to reduce costs. 
 
B. Communication Infrastructure of the SG Networks 
Infrastructure of the SG networks is composed from 
blocks. There are four basic types of these blocks: HAN 
(home area network), NAN (neighborhood), and WAN 
(wide) [5]. 
HAN are the smallest topological entities of Smart Grid 
networks. They can be also called PAN (premise), or BAN 
(building). These networks contain smart meters and 
information devices, which allow customers to influence 
their power consumption. All the devices are using 
traditional communication technologies like PLC, Wi-Fi, 
BACnet protocol, or ZigBee. Other devices belonging to the 
HAN are: programmable communicating thermostat (PCT), 
energy management system (EMS), in-home display (IHD), 
and plug-in electric vehicle (PEV) [6, 7]. 
NAN are aggregating points for HAN and are located 
within a substation. The used communication interface for 
the aggregation is the data aggregator unit (DAU) - it 
forwards the data into the WAN. NAN is using the same 
communication technologies as HAN, but can also utilize 
ANSI C12 protocols, or WiMAX [6, 8]. 
WAN represent the same area as in the traditional 
networks. They connect NAN into the energetic company 
network, most often using Ethernet, broadband connection, 
or a mobile network [6]. 
Energy generation company network receives all the data 
from lower layer networks like HAN and NAN. This data is 
then used for the specific analysis. The network contains 
servers and control centers for SCADA and WAMS 
technologies. The communication within this network uses 
Ethernet technology with metallic or optical links [6].    
 
C. The SG Threats Risk Management 
Risk management is a suitable technique for 
identification, evaluation, and resolution of risks and 
security threats in the SG networks. The risk management is 
defined by the international standard ISO 31000 [9]. 
The goal of the risk management is to map risks and to 
describe their impacts according to the cause-risk-impact 
model. The process includes prioritization and decisions 
about solutions to minimize the impacts of the risks. 
Prevention of risks is done using precautions, and to reduce 
the impacts of risks, reactive actions are defined. The choice 
of a proper action has to always come from the risk analysis 
results.   
The process of risk management includes five main 
phases:  
• Risk identification 
• Risk evaluation 
• Risk level expression 
• Identification of risk solving methods   
• Risk reduction according to the selected strategy  
These five phases include initial risk identification, 
analysis, evaluation; creation of reaction plan; monitoring; 
and prevention. The process also includes continuous 
communication and consultations. 
Every decision dealing with uncertainty has to be 
supported by analysis, which allows identification of the 
most dangerous threats and the problems they can cause. To 
perform a proper analysis, enough information has to be 
gathered. With the higher number of high quality 
information, the level of risk and uncertainty decrease. 
 
III. THE SG ATTACKS 
 
The following types of attacks were analyzed using the 
systematic approach to the network definition and the 
network relationship to the surroundings. The whole system 
was described as a control subsystem (Control Center) and 
controlled subsystem (Smart Grid Network). The system 
architecture is shown in Figure 1. The control subsystem 
contains control centers for SCADA and WAMS 
technologies and relevant inputs. The controlled subsystem 
contains a complete system of the SG network and relevant 
outputs. 
 
A. Attacks on Communication Networks NAN and HAN 
Communication networks in the area of HAN and NAN 
mostly use wireless technologies as was already mentioned. 
These technologies include mainly ZigBee, Wi-Fi, or 
WiMAX. The security issues of these technologies are 
described below according to [10]. 
Zigbee: Spoofed acknowledgment packets, Denial of 
Service (DoS) attack on AES-CTR, usage of the same keys 
on multiple ACLs, setting on a default encryption value 
when the electricity is lost. 
Wi-Fi: Radio spectrum congestion, congestion of default 
gateway using ICMP packets, SSID visibility, Access Point 
spoofing, MAC spoofing, Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) 
attack. 
WiMAX: Sending large amount of fake messages in order 
to increase end devices power consumption, jamming of the 
radio spectrum, no encryption of control frames, MitM 
attack. 
 
B. Attacks on SCADA Systems 
The SCADA systems are used for system monitoring and 
controlling of the entire electricity network. They are also 
connected to the data network which results in the following 
vulnerabilities: security issues of the used operating 
systems, wrong user policies management, wrong security 
policies (password requirements, account validity, etc.), no 
security software on the hosting server, DoS attack on the 
hosted server, insufficient network infrastructure security, 




Figure 1: Smart Grid systematic approach 
 
Moreover, the SCADA Modbus is not designed for highly 
security critical environments and it is therefore prone to 
attacks like broadcast message spoofing, direct slave 
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control, or passive reconnaissance.  
 
C. Attacks on AMIs 
Advanced metering infrastructures (AMIs) are used 
within the whole SG network and they transfer a lot of data 
including consumers' sensitive information. AMIs are prone 
to the following threats: unauthorized data access and 
manipulation, device theft, physical damage to the device, 
device eavesdropping, malware infecting the device, data 
integrity breach, malicious device insertion - simulating a 
legitimate device, personnel causing data leaks. 
These attacks can be further divided into the three areas: 
communication, physical, and system attacks. 
The first part of the communication attack is to detect the 
used technology. After its successful detection, known 
vulnerabilities can be misused. GPRS, for example, can be 
attacked using a femto cell attack [11]. 
Another type of communication attack is connecting to 
the SIM in the metering device over GPRS. The purpose of 
this connection is to cause error state, block the modem, or 
fill up the SIM's memory. 
Physical attacks require access to the metering device. 
The goal is to influence a device's functionality without 
causing visual damage to the device, which would be 
noticed by the power company employees (during the next 
inspection). 
The first group of physical attacks uses magnetic or 
electromagnetic field in order to influence the device's 
ability to measure power consumption, communicate, or the 
ability of switching between low and high tariffication. 
Depending on the attack type, either a powerful magnet, or a 
radio transmitting jammer is used in this attack type. 
A more radical type of attack uses overvoltage. In this 
type of attack, the attacker attaches a device emitting strong 
source of overvoltage to the proximity of the metering 
device. The overvoltage attack would typically permanently 
destroy the electronic circuits inside the device. 
The last type of attack is simple mechanical damage to 
the metering device. The goal is to disable communication 
between the device and communication infrastructure. 
Example of this attack might be damage to the antenna or 
it's shielding; or disconnecting the PLC communicator. This 
type of attack includes mechanical manipulation like phase 
bridging. In this scenario, one of the phases is disconnected 
or bridged in order to influence the metering device's ability 
to measure power consumption. 
In the system attack, the operating system, or 
configuration of the intelligent device is attacked. The 
operating system is usually in the form of a firmware or a 
lightweight-OS (when compared to the traditional operating 
systems). 
The most common system attack is the DoS. The DoS 
uses overloading of services in order to disable 
communication of legitimate users. This overloading can be 
done by generating a large amount of requests (if the target 
is a server) or just packets (if the target is a network). The 
DoS is typically only temporal - as soon as the malicious 
traffic stops, the network can get back into the operational 
state. 
The second type of attack is to mechanically access the 
electric metering device without triggering the "alarm". 
Triggering the alarm would immediately send the alert 
message to the control center. The attacker has to also try 
not to damage the device's security seals. If the attacker is 
successful, he can then block the communication channels, 
or access the device memory (and therefore delete the 
incident information). 
Attacks focused on the operating system itself can change 
the behavior of the operating system; like to disable its 
communication abilities. The examples of these attacks are: 
input, memory, and CPU congestion. These attacks use too 
long strings of characters, or high traffic load in order to 
congest the hardware and thus make the device unusable. 
These attacks can be prevented by using endpoint security 
tools like [12]. 
System attacks also include attacks on the system 
hardware like: A/D converter, memory, or passwords. 
Modification of the A/D converter can alter the 
measurement accuracy and is very hard to detect. Attack on 
memory can target various types of memory like: RAM; or 
memory for measured data, events, OS, or configuration. 
Password attacks like [13] are used to gain access rights into 
the device. 
 
D. Attacks on System for Demand Regulation 
The demand regulation is a security part of the system 
responsible for mitigating the network downtimes and 
therefore increasing the network effectivity. The biggest 
threats are: high load of the grid network (causing instability 
and possibly a blackout) and a shutdown of all the devices 
[10].   
 
E. Attacks on IP 
There is a large amount of well-known attacks on the IP. 
Their list can be found for example in [14]. Most of these 
attacks are the same or similar for both versions of IP-4 and 
6. 
The biggest difference between the versions is a new field 
for additional headers in IPv6, which can be misused for 
various attacks. Nowadays, the use of IPsec in IPv6 is not 
required (it is only recommended), making its security very 
similar to the IPv4. 
 
IV. SOLUTION MODELS OF THE SG RISKS 
 
This section proposes security solutions for the SG risks 
described in the previous section. These protection 
recommendation should minimize the risks and can be 
realized in the current SG networks. 
 
A. Securing Smart Metering Devices 
Smart metering devices protection is composed from two 
parts: mobile communication security and device security. 
The communication can be protected by using USSD and 
Call Barring services implemented in a smart metering 
devices' SIM. These services can restrict incoming and 
outgoing calls only to the necessary communication, 
effectively mitigating SIM's misuse. Additionally, a 
registration list with SIMs and their corresponding metering 
device should be used for easy detection of unallowed SIM 
transfer. 
The security of devices can be improved using the 
following techniques. Checking the data consistency in the 
control center can eliminate data loss, which can be caused 
by an attack. An effective monitoring technique via a 
watchdog device was described in [15]. Authenticated 
access to the internal database of Smart Grid should be used 
to protect sensitive information about consumers. Setting 
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modification, on a metering device, via optical interface 
should be disabled or protected with a physical obstacle 
(removable only in the case of local reading check by the 
certified employee of the electricity company). Lastly, 
communication with a third party should be disabled and a 
minimal required reading period should be set.   
 
B. Securing IP 
IP has to be secured regardless of version used (4 or 6). 
The following mechanisms are recommended. 
IPsec secures communication with authentication and 
encryption. Authentication verifies if data was send by the 
legitimate sender, while encryption ensures that only the 
legitimate receiver can read the message content. 
Partial protection against scanning attacks can be achieved 
with random assignments of IP addresses. On the other 
hand, it requires additional configuration (ideally using 
DHCPv6) and it complicates the network addressing. Its 
usage is therefore recommended only in the critical parts of 
the SG network, or somewhere, where the risk of the attack 
is high. 
DoS protection can be improved by disabling unneeded 
services (ICMP, UDP, etc.) and by specification of allowed 
IP addresses. Typically, broadcast and selected multicast 
addresses can be safely disabled. If some used systems do 
not comply with the RFC 5095 standard [16], packets with 
type 0 routing header should be disabled as well. 
MitM is another type of complex protection. One solution 
is the Secure Neighbour Discovery (SEND). Unfortunately, 
due to encryption operations, SEND has high computational 
requirements, making it less suitable for the SG 
environments [17]. MitM attacks using fake ICMPv6 
Neighbour Advertisements can be mitigated by monitoring 
neighbours' cache memory and notifying about change. 
Lastly, the fake DHCPv6 server protection should be 
deployed [18]. 
Additional security can be achieved if transmitted data is 
encrypted at the application layer. This layer is offering 
larger variability in encryption protocols, but it is important 
to consider performance of end devices (which are 
responsible for encryption and decryption). 
 
C. Device Authentication 
Device authentication is important in order to ensure, that 
proper devices are present and used within the network. 
Without the proper authentication, measuring devices could 
be replaced with fake ones. This would effectively give the 
attacker a free hand in data being sent into the SG network. 
Two basic models of authentication can be used, either by 
hardware address or public key. 
Authentication using hardware address integrated into 
IPv6. This protection is based on the unique identificator 
(ID) inserted into the IPv6 header. This ID can be generated 
automatically based on a secret key, MAC address, or 
unique number in a specialized chip. Unfortunately, this 
model is using only one-way authentication (client devices 
towards servers) and cannot be used if some devices do not 
support IPv6 (which is common in the SG networks). 
Authentication using public key. Public key infrastructure 
(PKI) is a complex solution using asymmetric cryptography. 
One of the functions of PKI is an electronic signature, which 
can ensure: identification, authentication, integrity, and non-
repudiation. PKI uses certification authorities, which allow 
to separate management of different parts of the system. If 
the certification authority for a selected part of the network 




The usage of Smart Grid networks is expected to rise in 
the future, especially with the rising demand for electricity. 
Only intelligent networks like the SG can effectively cope 
with the variability of these demands, and at the same time 
ensure reliability and resiliency of the infrastructure. In 
order to comply with these requirements, perfect security 
has to be implemented and used. 
This paper used a systematic approach to describe the 
possibilities of the SG attacks on various aspects of these 
networks. This include attacks on: communication networks, 
SCADA systems, AMIs, systems for demand regulation, 
and general IP attacks. The last section described 
recommended solution models for mitigating the SG risks in 
the area of smart metering devices, IP networks, and device 
authentication. It is important to emphasize, that although 
these recommendations can greatly reduce the risk of an 
attack, no mechanism can ensure absolute protection. This is 
especially true for the DoS or MitM type of attacks. It is 
therefore highly desirable to continue in the SG security 
research in order to develop and implement more robust 
security mechanisms. One of the promising ways to achieve 
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